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Preface
The concept of ‘market-based land reform’ has been central to policy 
debates in southern Africa for the past twenty-five years. During 
that time meanings and values ascribed to the concept have evolved 
considerably, with significant differences between, for example, how 
it has been applied in Zimbabwe in the 1980s and in South Africa 
from the mid-1990s. 
In the transition to democracy, South Africa has adopted a 
strongly pro-market approach to land reform, based in part on 
the supposed successes of this approach in Zimbabwe but also 
influenced by emerging international support for market-based land 
reforms. The ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ approach has come to 
signify not only a lack of compulsion on landowners and the payment 
of market-related prices for land, but also a minimal role for the state 
in strategic planning and implementation. This has led to a slow 
rate of land transfer and inappropriately designed, under-financed 
and isolated settlements poorly integrated to the agricultural 
economy and state support services. Wider, structural reforms that 
would support the emergence of new smallholders have not been 
forthcoming, as government has vigorously pursued deregulation of 
the agricultural sector and integration into world markets.
The emerging evidence from southern Africa suggests that market-
based land reforms have emerged in the context of regimes that are 
constrained from undertaking fundamental restructuring of the 
agrarian economy by a combination of internal and external forces. 
A market-based approach offers no threat to vested interests in land 
ownership, agri-business and the wider economy, while providing 
very limited benefits to selected beneficiaries. The experience of 
South Africa, in particular, suggests that market-based approaches 
are incapable of effecting a large-scale redistribution of land or 
restructuring of the agrarian economy, and are likely to be met with 
growing popular opposition as the crisis of rural livelihoods grows 
and the limitations of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ become apparent. 
This paper reviews the South African experience with land reform, 
and land redistribution in particular, up to the end of 2005. It 
does not, therefore, cover proposals for a proactive land acquisition 
strategy (PLAS) announced by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs during 2006, nor the issuing of a small number of 
expropriation orders for land under restitution. While the National 
Land Summit of July 2005 signalled a broad political and popular 
support for a shift away from market-based approaches, it remains 
to be seen whether recent policy proposals will in fact lead in that 
direction. 
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1. Introduction
The concept of ‘market-based land reform’ (MBLR, also market-assisted land reform, or market-led agrarian reform) has been central to the ‘new wave’ of land reform that has been in evidence internationally since the early 1990s. This 
so-called new wave followed a lull in land reform in most regions 
of the world during the 1980s, which marked the end of a long run 
of (capitalist and socialist) reforms in the decades since the end of 
the Second World War. This history, and the theoretical positions 
developed around it, have been debated extensively elsewhere, and 
will not be repeated here.2 Rather, this introductory section will 
focus on the relatively recent emergence of MBLR internationally and 
how the concept has been interpreted and applied in the southern 
African context. The subsequent section will look in detail at the case 
of South Africa, while the conclusion draws out key lessons for the 
region and their implications for land reform policies more generally. 
Moyo and Yeros (2005) make a useful distinction between three 
broad models of land reform, which they term ‘state’, ‘market’ and 
‘popular’. While current MBLR programmes would appear on the 
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surface to belong to the ‘market’ model, the analysis of Moyo and 
Yeros suggests that many of these may fit more closely to a modified 
(‘reformist’) state model, whereby the state engages in voluntary 
transactions in the market:
 
The state may also acquire the land through market means, 
the reformist ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ scenario; here, the 
market (i.e. the landlords) selects the land (if and when the 
landlords wish), the state purchases the land and compensates 
the landlords (often with external aid), the state selects the 
beneficiaries (unless again they have acted pre-emptively), and 
the state transfers title to them (Moyo & Yeros 2005:53). 
There is widespread agreement among scholars that MBLR has 
emerged as a reaction to the perceived weaknesses of state-led 
approaches (of both the capitalist and socialist varieties) to land and 
agrarian reform. Among the more commonly cited arguments are the 
inefficiencies of state and collective farms in China, the Soviet bloc, 
and their satellites in Africa, Asia and Latin America; the failure (and 
partial reversal) of redistribution schemes in parts of Latin America 
and Asia; and the distortion of various markets through trade 
protection, price regulation and producer subsidies.
The economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAPs), largely 
promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which dominated economic policy in the developing world in 
the 1980s, can be seen as both the gravedigger of ‘old order’ state-
led land reform, and the midwife of new market-friendly approaches. 
In response to widespread debt and fiscal crises, state expenditure 
in many countries was dramatically reduced and/or redirected, 
markets were liberalised and state agencies responsible for both 
agricultural production and distribution were either closed down or 
privatised. In other words, the key pillars of state-led development 
and regulation (‘developmentalism’ in Bernstein’s term) were 
systematically removed, not just in market-oriented economies (for 
example Brazil and Malawi) but also in nominally socialist-oriented 
ones (for example Tanzania and Zimbabwe). Adding to this shift in 
economic policies was the ideological crisis created by the fall of 
communism in the Soviet Union and its satellites, which undercut 
traditional left-wing opposition to market-oriented reforms. 
Against this shifting economic and ideological backdrop land 
reform once again found its way onto the political stage, but in 
forms dramatically different to those that dominated the previous 
era. Debates now focused around a relatively narrow spectrum of 
reforms rather than the wholesale restructuring of agrarian relations. 
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Nationalisation and collectivisation virtually disappeared from the 
agenda (with the possible exception of Zimbabwe); ‘land to the tiller’, 
widely seen as the most successful form of land reform throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was no longer an option due 
to the virtual disappearance of landlord estates from most countries 
in the world (with notable exceptions such as parts of south Asia and 
north Africa); the break-up of haciendas in favour of workers and 
peasants was generally out of favour due to the perceived difficulties 
in shifting from large- to small-scale production and from waged 
to family labour. This left only reform of communal (or traditional) 
tenure and modest redistribution of large-scale commercial farm 
land to selected beneficiaries – generally those deemed capable of 
‘commercial’ production, either individually or as part of a group. 
It is this form of redistribution that has been most associated with 
MBLR. However, as will be demonstrated below, the concept has 
been used in a variety of ways. 
MBLR is based on the claim that markets can bring about both 
efficiency and equity benefits by transferring land from less to more 
productive users (typically large to small) (Deininger and Binswanger 
1999). This has been central to the thinking of the World Bank 
and others since at least the 1970s (and therefore predates what 
became known as MBLR). What has changed, however, is a greater 
acknowledgement by neo-liberal economists that markets alone 
are unlikely to bring about the desired restructuring of property 
relations, due to a range of imperfections or distortions, including 
limited access to credit and information on the part of poorer 
buyers as well as the tendency of land prices to exceed productive 
(or agronomic) values. Thus, the use of grants is advocated in order 
to allow small or would-be farmers with limited capital or access 
to credit to enter the land market, but in ways that do not further 
‘distort’ the market (Van Zyl and Binswanger 1996:419), giving rise 
to what can best be described as assisted purchase schemes. 
While the acquisition of land via voluntary market transactions 
has been the hallmark of MBLR, a range of additional attributes have 
also become associated with this approach. Notably these include:
• the self-selection of beneficiaries 
• co-funding (‘own contribution’) by beneficiaries 
• an emphasis on farm planning prior to approval of grants (and 
thus prior to acquisition of land) 
• reliance on the private sector and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) rather than on state agencies to provide 
technical and financial support to beneficiaries (Deininger and 
Binswanger 1999; Borras 2003). 
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For its proponents, MBLR thus refers not just to the redistribution of 
land via the market but to a wider set of reforms that seek to:
• redistribute land 
• liberalise land and other markets (for example credit, 
agricultural inputs, agriculture produce) 3
• draw smallholders or ‘emergent’ farmers into more ‘commercial’ 
forms of production 
• and minimise the role of the state in the allocation of land, 
regulation of the agricultural economy and rural development 
(including support to new or small farmers).
Many of the above reforms of the agricultural sector are, of 
course, under way in countries in which land reform (particularly 
redistributive land reform) has not emerged as a priority. In those 
cases where market-based land reform is being pursued, it is 
possible to identify five key characteristics that define the approach: 
1. A landowner veto on participation in land reform – the market 
selects the land.
2. Payment of ‘market price’ for land (usually upfront, in cash) 
– the market sets the price.
3. Self-selection of beneficiaries (also referred to as ‘demand led’) 
– the market selects the beneficiaries.
4. A focus on ‘commercial’ forms of production – the market 
determines what is produced.
5. A prominent role for the private sector in provision of credit, 
extension and other services to beneficiaries – the market 
provides support.
The relative importance of these elements of MBLR may vary from 
country to country and over time. Under the Lancaster House 
constitution in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, for example, the first two 
were prominent, with less emphasis on the latter three. In Brazil, 
there has been less emphasis on production for the market; and 
in South Africa, since the mid-1990s, all five elements have been 
prominent. 
MBLR has attracted widespread criticism and popular opposition, 
both for the specific claims it makes and for what it fails to address. 
Among the issues raised by analysts have been: 
• the reluctance of landowners to respond favourably to market 
inducements 
• a tendency to push land prices up 
• exclusion of poorer beneficiaries 
• inappropriate farm planning (leading to project failures) 
• and the failure of private sector agencies to effectively replace 
state agricultural services (Riedinger et al 2000; El-Ghonemy 
2001; Borras 2003). 
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The most telling critique, however, has been the slow pace of land 
transfer in all countries undergoing MBLR. This raises far-reaching 
questions about the approach itself, and about the ability of states 
to implement such market-dependent programmes. For example, are 
the objectives of MBLR so modest that they depart fundamentally 
from traditional understandings of land and agrarian reform? Can 
modest reform programmes that do not fundamentally challenge 
the power of the current landowning classes, and that accept the 
inherited (albeit now liberalising) structure of agricultural economies, 
provide sufficient land and appropriate opportunities for the rural 
(and urban) poor to ‘accumulate from below’, and thereby address 
problems of chronic poverty and inequality? Answers to these and 
related questions clearly require in-depth analysis of specific country 
cases. 
Substantial debate has already ensued around MBLR in Brazil 
and the Philippines, but much less is known about MBLR in other 
countries. In southern Africa, what can be seen as a precursor of 
later policies began in Zimbabwe following independence in 1980. 
Here, market-based mechanisms were adopted as part of wider 
political and economic concessions made to white settlers during the 
transition, in particular the protection of white property interests. 
To retroactively apply the language of the 1990s, this could be seen 
as ensuring landowner ‘cooperation’ and avoiding ‘distorting’ the 
land market, but it is debatable whether such thinking had any 
currency at the time. Rather, the concept of ‘willing seller, willing 
buyer’ was seen (by all sides in the debate) as constraining the new 
state through granting landowners a veto on the reform process 
and ensuring that compensation had to be paid on the spot and at 
market rates (the first two of the five characteristics listed above) 
(Moyo 1995). Expropriation was permitted in cases of under-utilised 
land, but this too required payment upfront, and in hard currency. 
In other words, MBLR in the Zimbabwean case addressed the 
process of land acquisition but had little or nothing to say about 
issues such as beneficiary selection, forms of production on resettled 
land or the provision of support services, all of which tended to follow 
an older, state-led (‘developmentalist’) approach; what Moyo (1995) 
has termed a ‘state-centred market-based approach’. Zimbabwe can, 
therefore, be considered as a transitional case between the state-led 
reforms of the post-war and post-colonial era and the fully-fledged 
MBLRs of the 1990s. 
South Africa presents quite a different case. In contrast to 
countries such as Brazil and the Philippines, where MBLR evolved 
from (and has not entirely replaced) longer-running processes of 
non-market land reform, South Africa’s land reform programme has 
fallen entirely within the era and the parameters of MBLR, and has 
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been seen as somewhat of a textbook case. Factors that made South 
Africa a candidate for MBLR, apart from the timing of its liberation, 
were the extreme inequalities in landholding (particularly along racial 
lines), the highly commercialised nature of South African agriculture, 
the presence of a well-developed land market, and the commitment 
of the incoming African National Congress (ANC) government 
to neo-liberal economic policies and national reconciliation. 
Moreover, the historical path of agricultural development in South 
Africa – specifically, the destruction or extreme marginalisation 
of smallholders and tenant farmers and the consolidation of 
production in the hands of relatively few large-scale producers 
– meant that a ‘land to the tiller’ approach was not a realistic option 
(Bernstein 1996). Land reform, to be meaningful, would have to be 
fundamentally redistributive, benefiting not only those currently 
involved in agriculture but also those who had long been excluded 
from the sector. While there was considerable popular support for 
redistribution at the moment of liberation (albeit little clarity around 
how this could or should be achieved), the economic policies and 
wider political considerations of the incoming government precluded 
the use of virtually all traditional forms of redistribution – for 
example expropriation, nationalisation or collectivisation. MBLR 
therefore provided a timely, if at the time untested, approach that 
held out the promise of a rapid transfer of assets at little risk to 
political stability or economic output. 
2. MBLR in South Africa
In South Africa, debate around land reform since 1994 has focused on the specific concept of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ (WSWB), rather than the wider category of MBLR (Lahiff 2005). WSWB has some history of usage in South Africa, particularly 
around the (continuing) operation of the Expropriation Act 63 
of 1975,  under which the price paid for expropriated property 
(required, for example, for public works and so on) is determined by 
reference to the price that would be paid for the property were it to 
be exchanged between a willing seller and a willing buyer. In this 
context of expropriation, WSWB refers to an imaginary ideal rather 
than an actual practice. The phrase gained additional currency in 
the country with the extensive media coverage of land reform in 
Zimbabwe during the 1980s and early 1990s. There can be little 
doubt that this contributed much to its prominence within land 
reform discourse south of the Limpopo (Lahiff & Cousins 2001). This 
terminological borrowing – actively promoted by government, but not, 
interestingly, by the World Bank – has served to obscure the major 
differences between land reform policy in Zimbabwe (even in its most 
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‘moderate’ Lancaster House phase) and in South Africa. In particular, 
it has glossed over the much greater role of the state in Zimbabwe, 
including its right of first refusal on land sales, its ability to initiate 
transactions, and the effective nationalisation of purchased land – in 
short, expropriation and negotiated purchase with compensation 
paid at the equivalent of market prices. This contrasts starkly with 
the reactive (‘demand-led’) approach taken in South Africa, the 
reliance on the ‘open market’ and the freedom of landowners to sell 
to the buyer of their choice.
WSWB entered the discourse around land reform in South Africa 
gradually during the period 1993–1996, reflecting the shift in 
economic thinking of the ANC from left-nationalist to neo-liberal. It 
was entirely absent from the ANC’s Ready to Govern policy statement 
of 1992, which instead advocated expropriation and other non-
market mechanisms. It was similarly absent from the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP), the manifesto on which the party 
came to power in 1994. By the time of the White Paper on South 
African Land Policy 1997, however, a market-based approach, and 
particularly the concept of WSWB, had become the cornerstone 
of land reform policy.4 Such an approach was not dictated by the 
South African Constitution, which makes explicit provision for 
expropriation for purposes of land reform and for compensation at 
below market prices. It was rather a policy choice, in line with the 
wider neo-liberal (and investor-friendly) macro-economic strategy 
adopted by the ANC in 1996 (World Bank 1994; Hall, Jacobs & Lahiff 
2003).
Land reform in South Africa has consistently fallen far behind 
the targets set by the state and behind popular expectations. At the 
end of apartheid, virtually all commercial farmland in the country 
(approximately 86% of all farmland and 68% of the total surface 
area) was in the hands of the white minority and concentrated in 
the hands of approximately 60 000 owners (Bernstein 1996). In 
1994, the incoming ANC government, heavily influenced by World 
Bank advisors, set a target for the entire land reform programme 
(redistribution, tenure reform and restitution) of redistributing 30% 
of white-owned agricultural land within a five-year period (Williams 
1996). The target date was subsequently extended to twenty years 
(to 2014). At current rates of land transfer even this target is 
most unlikely to be met. The Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development programme (LRAD), the main instrument of market-
based redistribution launched after a major policy review in 2001, 
has to date only achieved 40% of its specific target, reportedly due to 
high land prices.5 
By July 2006 a total of 3.4 million hectares had been transferred 
through the various branches of the land reform programme, 
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benefiting an estimated 1.2 million people (see Table 1). The 
greatest amount of land (43.8%) was transferred under the 
redistribution programme, with lesser amounts being transferred 
through restitution, state land disposal and tenure reform.6 The 
total transferred is equivalent to 4.1% of the agricultural land in 
white ownership in 1994. Since much of the land transferred under 
restitution and tenure reform, some of the land transferred under 
redistribution, and all the land transferred under state land disposal, 
was formerly state-owned, the actual impact on white-owned land is 
considerably less (Hall 2004a).7 
. 
Programme Hectares redistributed Contribution to total (%)
Redistribution 1 477 956 43.8
Restitution 1 007 247 29.9
State land disposal 761 524 22.6
Tenure Reform 126 519 3.7
Total 3 373 246 100.0
Table 1: Total land transfers under South Africa land reform programmes, 1994–2006 (DLA 2006)
Missing from these statistics are the amount of ‘pure’ market 
redistribution (that is, land sales unconnected with the official land 
reform programme) and, more significantly, the vast number of 
farm dwellers (workers, tenants and their dependents) who have 
lost access to land on white-owned commercial farms since 1994. 
A recent study by Wegerif, Russell and Grundling (2005) found 
that over two million farm dwellers – many of them tenant farmers 
engaged in independent production – had been displaced between 
1994 and 2004, more than had been displaced in the last decade of 
apartheid (1984–94) and far more than the total number of people 
who had benefited under all aspects of the official land reform 
programme since it began.8 It must be stressed that the precise 
achievements of the land reform programme are a matter of intense 
debate, largely due to poor reporting by the state agencies involved.
The following sections examine the South African land reform 
programme under the five characteristics outlined above. 
2.1  Landowner veto on participation in land reform
In South Africa absolute landowner discretion over participation has 
become a defining feature of the state’s land reform programme. This 
discretion applies most directly in the areas of land redistribution 
and farm workers’ tenure reform, but also heavily influences the 
rights-based restitution process which, in theory and in law, falls 
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outside the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ paradigm.9 Not satisfied with 
granting this power of veto to landowners, the state has assiduously 
avoided, for a period of eleven years, any measures that could be 
construed as influencing landowners to sell, such as collective 
negotiation with land owners’ organisations, and has violently 
removed landless people illegally occupying land. Ironically, it has 
been a recurring complaint of landowners wishing to sell their land 
to the state for reform purposes that their offers are ignored, as 
official procedures are only geared to respond to potential buyers, not 
sellers. The Director-General of DLA recently told a parliamentary 
committee that his department turns down unsolicited offers from 
landowners, due to lack of capacity within the DLA and because the 
intended beneficiaries have not been identified in advance:
In many cases they [the landowners] will not say who the people 
are who will benefit ... It’s not a supply driven system … The 
department is unwilling to acquire land without an immediate 
beneficiary in sight, because of capacity problems within its own 
ranks (Farmer’s Weekly, 4 November 2005).
While there is certainly an active land market in South Africa, there 
is reason to believe that much of the land being transacted is not 
available to land reform beneficiaries.10 There have been widespread 
accusations of collusion among racist landowners opposed to land 
reform, but evidence on the extent of such action is limited (Aliber & 
Mokoena 2002; Tilley 2004). Good quality land that comes onto the 
open market tends to be sold by public auction or private contract, 
and transfer of ownership typically takes place within about three 
months of the initial offer to sell. Funding applications from would-be 
land reform beneficiaries generally take significantly longer than this 
to process and must be linked to a specific property. 
The approval process requires, amongst other things, a written 
agreement to sell from the landowner, an agreed price that is 
confirmed as ‘market-related’ by an independent valuer and a 
detailed farm plan, all of which can take anywhere between three 
months and two years to assemble. Thus, would-be beneficiaries 
cannot participate in auctions, nor ‘shop around’, nor confirm a 
purchase within the usual time frame and so are excluded from the 
great majority of sales in what continues to be a highly competitive 
land market.11 The ‘willing sellers’ are in practice required to wait for 
an extended period for confirmation of sale and face the risk that the 
application will be turned down on technical grounds or because of 
an absence of available funds.12 While little firm evidence has been 
produced on this point to date, it seems reasonable to assume that 
only a landowner who is exceptionally committed to the cause of 
land reform, or who cannot dispose of land by other means (due to 
Table 1: Total land transfers under South Africa land reform programmes, 1994–2006 (DLA 2006)
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poor location or quality of land, for example), will be likely to enter 
into a land reform transaction (Aliber & Mokoena 2002). The obvious 
(‘market-based’) alternative, that the state itself purchases the land 
on behalf of approved beneficiaries, has been rejected by the DLA on 
the questionable grounds that this would constitute a ‘supply-led’ 
approach and risk the state being left with land which it could not 
maintain or dispose of.
In a number of important respects, the policies implemented by 
the South African government diverge from the MBLR model, in 
ways that tend to inhibit the availability of land. Firstly, the need 
for a land tax has long been argued as a means of encouraging the 
sale of underused land and limiting speculation. To date, the South 
African government has avoided it as part of its general policy of 
reducing taxation and encouraging private sector investment, and 
due to opposition from landowners. Secondly, subdivision of large 
holdings is widely seen as a key element in promoting access to 
land, especially in countries with highly concentrated landholdings. 
Subdivision of agricultural holdings was legally prohibited under 
apartheid and, although the law has now been repealed by 
parliament, it has been waiting over four years for the presidential 
signature necessary to make it effective and does not appear to 
enjoy political support. Moreover, subdivision of land is seen as an 
expensive and administratively cumbersome process and is unlikely 
to be undertaken by landowners even once legally permitted (Aliber 
& Mokoena 2002). The result is that land continues to come onto the 
market in relatively large lots and groups of would-be beneficiaries 
are obliged to pool their grants in order to acquire them.13 No 
assistance is provided to beneficiaries wishing to subdivide 
properties after acquisition, a process actively discouraged by land 
reform officials.
Thus, limited grant sizes, limited budgets, lengthy and 
restrictive approval processes and landowner bias combine to 
ensure that would-be land reform beneficiaries are restricted to a 
small proportion of the land coming onto the market every year. 
Consequently, beneficiaries often end up with land that is of 
relatively poor quality and more extensive than they would wish 
for. Relatively poor, inexperienced and ill-informed land reform 
applicants find it virtually impossible to compete in an ‘open market’ 
with more experienced and better resourced buyers. A considerable 
proportion of land ‘redistribution’ actually involves state-owned land, 
which does not involve a market transaction and, more importantly 
politically, leaves white-owned property largely untouched.14
2.2  Payment of ‘market prices’ for land 
The payment of market (or market equivalent) prices has been 
central to MBLR in South Africa and is intimately connected with 
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the landowner veto. Unlike the case in Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 
1990s, landowners not only have the choice of whether or not to 
sell their land, but may also chose to whom they sell and at what 
price. Payment of market prices has been strenuously opposed by 
organisations representing landless people, as demonstrated at the 
National Land Summit of July 2005, but landowners have declared 
it ‘non-negotiable’. Indeed, recent pronouncements by landowners’ 
representatives suggest there may be some acceptance of non-
market measures, even expropriation, to acquire land, but not of 
compensation at below market rates.15 
Prices paid for land for reform purposes are, in practice, set by 
professional land valuers16 retained by the DLA, who generate their 
own estimate of ‘market price’ based on factors such as recent sales 
of comparable properties in the area. Where such an estimate falls 
below the asking price of the landowner, some limited negotiation 
is entered into between the DLA and the landowner (usually by 
mail). Landowners are free to accept or reject the offer made by 
DLA. The intended beneficiaries have no direct role in this process 
and therefore have no power to influence the price paid or the final 
outcome of the negotiations. Cases have been reported of deals 
falling through due to minuscule differences between the asking 
price and the amount offered by DLA, suggesting that negotiating 
skills may not be adequate amongst DLA officials (Tilley 2004). 
There are widespread accusations that land reform transactions 
pay more than the market rate for land, due to high prices demanded 
by landowners and possible collusion between owners, valuers 
and officials, although little firm evidence is available to support 
this. In March 2005 Parliament  heard of a case in Mpumalanga 
province involving collusion between a senior DLA official, valuers 
and landowners, where farms were bought for ten times the price at 
which they had traded just a few years before: 
Under the scam, farmers inflated the value of their farms and 
valuators confirmed these falsified valuations, which were 
then presented to corrupt government officials who then issued 
payment. The farmers then gave kickbacks to the official and 
valuator (Business Day, 11 May 2005).  
Aliber and Mokoena (2002:27) argue that MBLR in South Africa 
places landowners in a strong negotiating position for the following 
reasons:
• the limited number of properties being offered for land reform 
purposes
• applicants often have a strong preference for a particular 
property (due to its proximity to their current residence or 
because of ancestral connections)
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• the additional cost that would be incurred (for government and 
applicants) if negotiations were to collapse and the lengthy 
planning process had to begin again for another property. 
In a study from the Northern Cape province, Tilley (2004) identified a 
perception among landowners that both land reform applicants and 
the DLA were ‘unreliable’ negotiating partners: applicants because 
they do not have autonomy to engage in negotiations on their own 
behalf and remain dependent on officials to determine the ultimate 
grant amount and to finalise the transaction; DLA because of ‘its 
protracted procedures, negotiating style and phased project cycle’ 
(Tilley 2004:38). An estate agent with experience of the land reform 
process characterised the view of landowners in the following terms:
The DLA process is too slow. The Department does not seem able 
to keep up with the pace of land transactions and sellers get 
frustrated. Sellers have now reached the point where they prefer 
to avoid negotiating with the DLA or making their land available 
for land reform simply because of the bureaucratic process and 
the long waiting period in between each phase of the transaction 
(Quoted in Tilley 2004:39). 
Price setting, therefore, occurs through highly bureaucratic 
processes that bear only a distant relationship to the workings of 
the ‘real’ land market. ‘Willing sellers’ and the ‘willing buyers’ often 
find themselves caught up in protracted and uncertain processes 
dominated by officials attempting to apply market ‘principles’, a far 
cry from ‘the independent encounter of willing buyers and sellers in 
the market’ envisaged by its proponents (Deininger 1999:12).
A specific claim of MBLR is that it will make itself attractive to 
landowners and keep prices down by paying the landowners in full 
at the time of sale. The opposite appears to be the case in South 
Africa. Landowners and their representatives complain not only of 
the lengthy and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures around sale 
agreements, but also delays in payment once agreement has been 
reached. 
In some instances, [according to the vice-chairperson of 
AgriLimpopo] farmers sold their farms four years ago and are still 
waiting for the money from government and the transaction to be 
completed. They are still on the farms hoping that someday they 
can move on (Mail & Guardian, 22 April 2005). 
We can conclude that while market prices serve as a guide to prices 
paid in land reform transactions, the process is open to manipulation 
and both the negotiation process and the time involved bear little 
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resemblance to conventional market transactions. Intended land 
reform beneficiaries are incapable of competing in the open land 
market and are compelled to fall back on ‘closed’ sales negotiation 
between landowners and officials. The bureaucratic complexity of 
the process does not make it attractive to landowners and it is likely 
that at least some landowners enter into land reform transactions 
in order to dispose of property that they would not be able to sell 
otherwise, or because they believe they can obtain a price more 
favourable than they might on the open market. 
2.3  Self-selection of beneficiaries
MBLR is premised on the principle that the beneficiaries will ‘self 
select’, rather than be selected by government officials. In practice, 
self-selection may ensure that people who have no interest in land 
reform are excluded, but it does not guarantee that those in most 
need of land manage to access the programme or that those who 
apply to the programme acquire the land they want. This is due to a 
combination of market factors (as described above) and non-market 
factors, specifically the process of application, approval and funding 
administered by state officials. 
Little is known about the type of people benefiting from land 
reform, those who apply and are rejected, and those not being 
reached by the programme at all. Since its inception, the South 
African Land Reform Programme has been beset by a lack of basic 
information arising from inadequate (and often non-existent) 
monitoring and evaluation processes.17 This results in a dearth of 
reliable data on the socio-economic characteristics of beneficiaries 
entering the programme (for example educational level, employment 
status, asset ownership, income, agricultural experience) as well 
as the impact of land reform on livelihoods and the agricultural 
economy. It should be stressed that while some of this can be 
attributed to poor data management systems within the DLA and 
on infrequent reporting, much of the problem – especially regarding 
socio-economic profile of beneficiaries – is due to the fact that 
relevant data is simply not collected in the first instance. Hence there 
has been considerable speculation around who exactly is benefiting 
from the programme and how this might be changing over time. 
The few studies available suggest that only a small proportion of 
the landless and land-hungry are gaining access to the programme; 
that they are predominantly literate males over forty years of age; 
and, increasingly, that they are those with access to wage income 
(including pensions), rather than the unemployed, and have 
relatively good access to information (Lahiff 2000; Wegerif 2004; 
Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003; Hall 2004b). A study by the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) found that the LRAD programme 
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was reaching a range of applicants, but could not confirm the 
inclusion of the very poor:
Although LRAD  clearly caters more to well-off applicants … it 
is still widely accessed by poor households. Whether or not the 
‘poorest of the poor’ are accessing LRAD in significant numbers is 
unclear. (HSRC 2003).  
This reflects both the differential ability of individuals to access the 
state programme and deliberate choices made by policy makers and 
implementers. 
While land reform policy officially aims to reach a range of 
beneficiaries – including women, young people, the unemployed, 
farm workers and aspirant commercial farmers – there has been a 
discernable shift in policy in favour of the latter group in recent years 
(Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003). This is manifested in two main ways – 
the size of individual grants and loans awarded and the criteria used 
to evaluate ‘business plans’ (that is, land use plans and financial 
projections). 
Since 2001 the size of grants awarded to successful land reform 
applicants has been determined by the size of the ‘own contribution’ 
made by the applicant. ‘Own contribution’ can be in cash or in kind 
(for example, agricultural equipment or livestock).18 Grants can also 
be used to leverage loans from the state-owned Land Bank and 
visa versa – loans can be used as ‘own contribution’ to leverage 
grants, further favouring those with demonstrable assets. ‘Own 
contributions’ do not necessarily contribute to the purchase of land, 
especially when the contribution is in kind rather than in cash, 
meaning that the land is in most cases purchased entirely from the 
land reform grant or, less commonly, by a combination of grant and 
loan (Hall 2004b). Far from being a ‘contribution’ to the farming 
enterprise and thereby ensuring commitment (or ‘buy-in’), as the 
advocates of MBLR would suggest, ‘own contribution’ in the South 
African case simply qualifies the applicant to a greater or lesser 
degree of financial support, as estimates of asset worth are used 
to ‘reward’ applicants with varying levels of grants and loans. This 
appears to be a crude exercise in ‘backing the winner’ (or at least 
the better off) – which may well lead to more ‘viable’ or ‘successful’ 
projects for the lucky few, but not for the reasons generally given.
While the scale of ‘own contribution’ determines the size of grant, 
the approval of funding depends on the production of an acceptable 
business plan that demonstrates ‘economic viability’. This is 
discussed below. 
Early in the South African land reform programme, Zimmerman 
(2000) identified a range of barriers created by the concept of 
‘demand led rationing’, or self-selection that are likely to exclude 
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poorer groups. Zimmerman highlights the lack of clarity within policy 
on the intended beneficiaries of land reform and argues that without 
a clear emphasis on poverty reduction, a demand-led programme 
is likely to be driven largely by considerations of racial equity that 
assume a homogenous black population:
A clear danger under the demand-led rationing scheme is that the 
wealthier segments of the rural population will prove more apt to 
participate, and therefore be the major beneficiaries, while the 
poorer segments will be left largely without programme benefits 
(Zimmerman 2000:1441). 
Ongoing failure to define clearly the intended beneficiaries of 
land reform, the lack of a specific poverty alleviation strategy, an 
emphasis on economic viability and a chronic failure to monitor the 
programme suggest that the exclusion of poor and marginalised 
groups is likely to continue.
2.4  Focus on ‘commercial’ forms of production
As argued above, current land reform policy in South Africa makes 
extensive use of the language of commercial and economic ‘viability’. 
This emphasis has increased considerably since the beginning of 
the programme, particularly since the introduction of the LRAD 
programme in 2001. LRAD was intended to address a perceived 
gap in the previous Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) 
programme, which provided relatively small grants to low-income 
households but did not meet the needs of ‘emerging’ (that is, better 
off and more commercially oriented) farmers. Within months of 
being launched as a ‘sub-programme’ of redistribution, LRAD had 
almost entirely replaced SLAG, which is now used only for small, 
non-agricultural projects (for example housing and small business 
development). Thus, the ‘commercial’ logic of LRAD is applied to all 
land reform applicants, regardless of their resources, abilities or 
stated objectives (Lahiff 2001; Lahiff & Cousins 2005).
This ‘commercial’ logic is imposed by the ubiquitous business 
plans, produced by agricultural officials or private consultants 
appointed by the DLA who may make only cursory contact with the 
intended beneficiaries (HSRC 2003; Hall 2004b; Wegerif 2004). Such 
plans typically provide ultra-optimistic projections for production 
and profit, based on textbook models drawn from the large-scale 
commercial farming sector, and further influenced by past use of 
the land in question (Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003). Business plans 
commonly assume large amounts of working capital, which typically 
is not available from the land reform grant and cannot be provided 
by the beneficiaries themselves. Failure to obtain loans, as is often 
the case, renders the business plan unworkable, yet officials usually 
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insist that beneficiaries comply with such plans and make this a 
condition for the release of discretionary grants that beneficiaries 
may be entitled to. In cases where credit has been accessed in order 
to implement the business plan there have been widespread reports 
(but no official data) of defaults on loans, leading to some threatened 
repossession of properties by the banks. The state has intervened in 
a number of cases in an effort to prevent repossession by providing 
additional funding.
A central weakness of most business plans is that they assume 
that the farm will be operated as a single entity (that is, as used 
by the previous owner), regardless of the size of the beneficiary 
group (HSRC 2003). As argued above, due to the lack of support for 
subdivision, beneficiaries are often obliged to purchase properties 
much larger than they need and to expand the size of groups to 
aggregate sufficient grants to meet the purchase price. This results in 
many projects taking on enterprises larger than they would wish for 
and widespread problems of group dynamics as former single-owner 
farms are turned into agricultural collectives. The strong emphasis 
on collective production stems directly from the need to form groups 
in order to acquire large land holdings and the refusal of officials 
to contemplate subdivision or other deviations from established 
agricultural practice. Official policy documents are remarkably 
silent on the preferred forms of land use, and nowhere in the official 
discourse are the words ‘collective’ or ‘group farming’ used. Yet 
attempts at collective farming have become a hallmark of land reform 
projects in South Africa, and undoubtedly one of the main reasons 
for the high rate of project failure.19 
 Bradstock (2005:16) describes the situation in the Northern Cape 
province thus: 
… DLA is responsible for developing [business] plans but 
they are usually done in isolation and are written primarily to 
satisfy administrative rather than developmental objectives. 
With no plans to guide the groups, many of them manage 
their farms in an ad hoc manner. This  often leads to a 
shortage of money at key times in the agricultural calendar, 
such as paying for the planting or harvesting of a crop. 
Moreover, due to the difficulties of gaining access to credit the 
group often faces ‘cash crises’ that are resolved by selling 
the farm’s more liquid assets such as cattle … which may 
endanger the future financial sustainability of the project.
In their single-minded attempts to emulate large-scale commercial 
farmers, within a policy discourse that privileges the market above 
all, state officials have succeeded in creating a parody of private 
enterprise – groups of largely poor black farmers, struggling, 
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and often failing, in what is probably the only state-sponsored 
agricultural collectivisation in the world today. 
The strong focus on ‘commercial agriculture’ has also led to a large 
number of joint ventures with established commercial farmers, 
notably ‘share equity schemes’ whereby farm workers use their land 
reform grants to buy shares in existing enterprises. High land prices, 
high start-up costs and highly competitive markets in sectors such 
as horticulture and viticulture mean that share equity schemes 
have been the principal form of ‘redistribution’ in areas such as 
the Western Cape province. In a study of a range of joint ventures, 
Mayson (2003) found that few had resulted in a significant transfer 
of power or benefits to workers, particularly where workers only 
obtained a minority share in the enterprise. The study concludes 
that many are motivated by the owner’s need for additional capital.
The requirement that business plans show ‘commercial viability’ 
and the effective prohibition on subdivision mean that most land 
reform projects are created in the (distorted) image of existing large-
scale commercial farms. The widespread demand for small plots of 
land for household food supply and part-time employment voiced in 
numerous studies (Marcus, Eales & Wildschut 1996; Levin & Weiner 
1997; Lahiff 2000) and by organisations of the rural poor such as the 
Landless Peoples Movement, finds little space within the official land 
reform programme. 
2.5  Prominent role for the private sector in provision of credit, extension and 
other services
As with many other aspects of market-based land reform in South 
Africa, the anticipated role of the private sector has not materialised 
to the extent assumed by its proponents. The past two decades 
have seen a major reduction in the overall state services available to 
farmers. Large commercial farmers have managed to overcome this 
through access to a range of commercial and cooperative services, 
but land reform beneficiaries and other small-scale farmers are 
largely left to fend for themselves (Vink & Kirsten 2003). Recent 
studies show that land reform beneficiaries experience numerous 
problems accessing services such as credit, training, extension 
advice, transport and ploughing services, veterinary services, and 
access to input and produce markets (HSRC 2003; Hall 2004b; 
Wegerif 2004; Bradstock 2005).
Services that are available to land reform beneficiaries tend to 
be supplied by provincial departments of agriculture and a small 
number of NGOs, but the available evidence would suggest that 
these only serve a minority of projects. In a study of LRAD projects 
in three provinces the HSRC found that ‘…in many cases there 
is still no institutionalised alternative to laying the whole burden 
of training, mentoring and general capacitation on the provincial 
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agricultural departments’ (HSRC 2003: 72). In a study of nine LRAD 
projects in the Eastern Cape province Hall (2004b) found not one had 
obtained any support from the private sector, and most had not had 
any contact with either the DLA or the Department of Agriculture 
since obtaining their land. 
In November 2005 the Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs 
told parliament that 70% of land reform projects in Limpopo province 
were dysfunctional, which she attributed to poor design, negative 
dynamics within groups, and lack of post-settlement support 
(Farmer’s Weekly, 18 November 2005). 
For Jacobs (2003), the general failure of post-settlement or post-
transfer support stems from a failure to conceptualise land reform 
beyond the land transfer stage, and poor communication between the 
national DLA (responsible for land reform) and the nine provincial 
Departments of Agriculture (responsible for state services to farmers): 
The rigid distinction in South Africa’s land policy between 
land delivery and agricultural development has resulted in 
post-transfer support being largely neglected. There is no 
comprehensive policy on support for agricultural development after 
land transfer and the agencies entrusted with this function have 
made little progress in this regard. Agricultural assistance for 
individual land reform projects is ad hoc … (Jacobs 2003:7).
This lack of coordination between the key departments of agriculture 
and land affairs is compounded by poor communication with 
other key institutions such as the Department of Housing and 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, as well as local 
government structures (Hall et al. 2004). The need for additional 
support for land reform beneficiaries has of late been acknowledged 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs and has led to 
the introduction, in the national budget for 2004/05, of a new 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) with a 
total of R750 million allocated over five years. In addition to this 
grant facility, plans are underway to reintroduce the previously 
discontinued Agricultural Credit Scheme, also aimed at small and 
‘emerging’ farmers (but not exclusively land reform beneficiaries) 
(Hall & Lahiff 2004).
The well-developed (private) agri-business sector that services 
large scale commercial agriculture has shown no more than a token 
interest in extending its operations to new farmers, who in most 
cases would be incapable of paying for such services anyway. The 
assumption that the private sector would somehow ‘respond’ to 
demand from land reform beneficiaries with very different needs to 
the established commercial farmers has not been demonstrated by 
recent experience. The principal explanation for this, of course, is 
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that land reform beneficiaries are, on the whole, so cash-strapped 
that they are not in a position to exert any effective demand for the 
services on offer, even if these services were geared to their specific 
needs.
3. Conclusion 
Market-based land reform makes claims for both equity and efficiency, but serious concerns have been raised around both dimensions in the case of South Africa, echoing the experience of Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
extremely slow pace of reform (far below official targets) is the most 
obvious limitation to equity gains, but this is compounded by an 
emphasis on disposal of state land and tenure upgrading, which 
leaves the vast majority of white-owned land untouched. The disposal 
of land already allocated for use by black people, together with the 
mass removal of farm dwellers, merely serves to complete processes 
begun under apartheid, and results in little net redistribution of 
assets. In addition, a range of barriers imposed by the functioning 
of the market and by bureaucratic processes, together with the lack 
of a credible strategy for poverty alleviation, make it likely that the 
principal equity gains will be along lines of race, but with limited 
benefits flowing to the very poor. More definitive conclusions will 
require much better data than is currently available. Indeed, it is 
symptomatic of the unstrategic nature of the programme that it 
attempts to operate without an effective feedback of quality data into 
the planning and implementation process.
On efficiency, the limited information emerging from the 
programme suggests that the picture is largely negative, at least 
in the short term. Projects are taking exceedingly long to become 
operational – delays of two or three years from date of transfer of 
title are not unusual – due to a combination of over-ambitious and 
inappropriate business plans, shortages of working capital and 
slow release of supplementary grants from the relevant government 
departments. Those projects that do achieve production generally 
do so at a very low level, making use of only a minority of the 
land acquired and at low levels of intensity, in both arable and 
livestock farming.20 While this might represent some improvement in 
agricultural output for the individuals concerned (generally from a 
very low base) and even for the particular farm (anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some farms were inoperative in the years immediately 
preceding redistribution), it represents a poor return on the public 
resources invested and undermines the political argument for 
reform.21 
MBLR in South Africa has managed to transfer relatively small 
amounts of land, an average of around 0.36% of the targeted 
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agricultural land per annum, and only about 6% of the total land 
transacted through the deeds registry every year. Land reform 
transactions depart considerably from ‘normal’ market transactions 
and appear to be concentrated on less sought-after land that is 
purchased at prices higher than it might fetch on the open market. 
The bureaucratic complexity of the application and approval process 
ensures that intended beneficiaries are not able to compete in the 
‘real’ market, but rather operate in a parallel market controlled by 
bureaucrats where they have little influence over the final purchase 
negotiations or the price paid. Business planning models, based 
on questionable assumptions around ‘economic viability’, together 
with the absence of any anti-poverty strategy, serve to discriminate 
against the very poor, and do not necessarily make for more 
‘successful’ projects. A strong official bias towards continuity of 
production systems, and against subdivision of land, contributes 
to the under-performance of many projects and effectively excludes 
the majority of land seekers who require small areas of land 
mainly for household consumption purposes. The anticipated 
private-sector support services for new and emerging farmers have 
not materialised, largely due to the low productivity and limited 
availability of working capital among intended beneficiaries. This has 
meant continued reliance on state support services, but these remain 
poorly coordinated and poorly targeted.
A central question that arises is whether the poor performance 
of MBLR in South Africa can be attributed to the model itself, or to 
the partial manner in which the model has been applied. There can 
be little doubt that an active land market presents opportunities for 
redistribution, but these opportunities are largely being missed due 
to the inability of state institutions or the intended beneficiaries to 
engage effectively in that market.22 Failures to introduce a land tax 
or to encourage subdivision further militate against redistribution 
via the market, creating new demand without directly addressing 
the question of supply. The one positive contribution that the 
state could possibly make within the confines of a ‘market-based’ 
approach, drawing on the experience of Zimbabwe, would be to 
proactively acquire land (for pre-identified beneficiaries) as it comes 
on to the market, on the basis of clearly identified needs. This could 
be achieved through conventional purchases or on the basis of a 
right of first refusal without having to inflict cumbersome project 
planning and beneficiary selection processes on would-be sellers and 
buyers alike. Yet this has been repeatedly rejected by the state on the 
questionable basis that it would constitute a ‘supply-led’ approach 
and would undermine the concept of ‘self selection’. Thus, on one 
hand, it can be argued that the poor performance of the South 
African land reform programme can be attributed, at least in part, 
to the inefficient manner in which the market-based model is being 
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applied. On the other hand, however, the available evidence suggests 
that a more robust application of MBLR would still encounter major 
structural and administrative problems with regard to both equity 
and efficiency objectives. 
Without appropriate support from an effective state apparatus, 
relatively poor people are unlikely to obtain land on the open 
market or to make use it in ways that have a significant positive 
impact on their own livelihoods or on the wider economy. Given a 
choice, landowners will continue to favour conventional channels 
(of both the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ variety) for the disposal of land and 
avoid ‘unreliable’ land reform transactions. Even if the market 
could supply the necessary land to those who need it, the available 
evidence suggests that most beneficiaries would continue to rely 
on the state for support for the foreseeable future and are unlikely 
to conform to the dominant ‘commercial’ model of agricultural 
production currently being promoted. 
There is clearly little enthusiasm within the dominant social 
and political forces in South Africa for a radical redistribution of 
land, and MBLR strategies have provided the justification for the 
avoidance of traditional state-led and popular approaches to land 
reform. Populist rhetoric about the need to look ‘beyond the market’ 
continues to be used by senior politicians to placate the rural 
social movements on occasions such as the National Land Summit, 
but this contrasts starkly with the repeated assurances given to 
large-scale commercial farmers in forums such as the Presidential 
Working Group on Agriculture, and to black business interests 
eyeing opportunities under the new Agricultural Black Economic 
Empowerment (AgriBEE) programme. On the side of landowners 
– many of them openly hostile to the new democratic order and the 
land reform process – MBLR has created opportunities to sell land 
that they might not otherwise be able to dispose of, and at prices 
higher than what the market might offer. It has provided cash 
injections with little change in power or flow of benefits in the case of 
share equity schemes, and allowed landowners as a whole to claim to 
be ‘doing something’ about land reform. 
MBLR in South Africa has focussed attention on land reform in 
the narrowest sense (transfer of land) and has left the structures of 
land ownership and the agricultural economy not only intact but 
largely unchallenged. By refusing to intervene decisively on the part 
of the landless (either via the market or otherwise) or to challenge 
the interests of established landowners and agricultural capital in 
any way, policy based on MBLR has shown itself to be incapable 
of fundamentally changing the conditions which recreate poverty, 
landlessness and inequality. The emerging evidence from South 
Africa (and recent experience in Zimbabwe) suggests that MBLR 
does not offer a politically or economically sustainable solution to 
land reform in post-colonial settler societies. It remains to be seen 
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whether opposition to current policies from the landless and land 
hungry in South Africa will lead to a more interventionist approach 
on the part of the state or the emergence of more popular forms of 
redistribution ‘from below’.
Endnotes
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented to a conference on 
Land, Poverty, Social Justice and Development, Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague. 12-14 January 2006.
2 See Bernstein (2002); Borras (2003); and Deininger and 
Binswanger (1999).
3 Introduction of a tax on land (particularly on unused or under-
used land) has been promoted as part of MBLR, as a means of 
curbing land speculation and hoarding and thereby increasing 
the supply (and reducing the cost) of land coming onto the market 
(World Bank 2003). In practice, such ‘supply side’ measures have 
rarely been implemented, and MBLR strategies have thus focused 
mainly on the demand side. 
4 ‘Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing-
buyer willing-seller arrangements. Government will assist in 
the purchase of land, but will in general not be the buyer or 
owner. Rather it will make land acquisition grants available 
and will support and finance the required planning process. In 
many cases, communities are expected to pool their resources 
to negotiate, buy and jointly hold land under a formal title deed.’ 
(Department of Land Affairs 1997:4.3)
5 Report by Director General of DLA to parliamentary portfolio 
committee on agriculture and land affairs, quoted in Farmer's 
Weekly, 4 November 2005.
6 Much of the land transferred (or ‘delivered’, to use the official 
term) under the restitution programme has been transferred in 
nominal ownership only, as the land remains incorporated into 
nature reserves and state forests and, in terms of the restitution 
agreements, is not accessible for direct use by the restored 
owners (Hall 2003:27).
7 The redistribution programme is the most discretionary of 
the land reform programmes in South Africa (as opposed to 
restitution and tenure reform which are strongly rights-based), 
and is therefore the main focus of MBLR. The explicit aim of this 
programme is to address the racial imbalance in land holding. In 
a study of Limpopo province, however, Wegerif (2004) found that 
of the first twenty farms allocated under LRAD, only one involved 
white-owned land (the rest being state land or, in one case, land 
owned by a church).
8 Of an estimated 2 351 086 people displaced from farms since 
1994, 942 303 (40%) were found to have been evicted; others 
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left for a variety of social and economic reasons (Wegerif et al. 
2005:7).
9 Under the constitutionally mandated restitution process, people 
who lost their land rights under racially discriminatory policies 
between 1913 and 1994 are entitled to claim restitution. Of 
the 78 000 individual and community claims lodged, the vast 
majority have been settled by means of cash compensation, 
thereby avoiding land restoration. In the minority of cases where 
claimants have held out for restoration of their land, only those 
involving a ‘willing seller’ have been settled to date (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs 2004). The state has recently 
threatened to use its legal powers of expropriation against the 
remaining ‘uncooperative’ landowners, but has yet to do so in 
practice. 
10 Aliber and Mokoena (2002: 9) report that an average of 6.3% 
of rural land was transacted per year in the period 1995–2000, 
but this included a high proportion of inter-family transfers 
(inheritance) and what Lebert (2004:10) refers to as ‘closed sales’ 
between neighbours or acquaintances. 
11 Each offer to purchase requires separate approval and a separate 
farm plan. Proposals that would-be beneficiaries are ‘pre-
approved’ for funding on the basis of personal attributes and 
outline business plans, thereby allowing them to enter the market 
as effective buyers, have been rejected by the DLA.
12 Insufficient budgets to fund approved projects have been a 
recurring problem since about 2003, leading to additional (post-
approval) delays in transactions (Hall & Lahiff 2004: 2).
13 In the early years of the land reform programme, groups in excess 
of 100 households were common. Today, following increases in 
grant sizes and more restrictive qualification criteria, groups 
within the redistribution programme are typically in the range 
five to  twenty households. Large group sizes and collective 
production continue to characterise the ‘community based’ 
restitution claims (Hall 2004: 52).
14 Wegerif’s (2004) study of Limpopo suggests that many 
transactions do not involve redistribution of any sort, as 
beneficiaries used grants to buy land that they had been 
occupying (rent free and without contestation) for decades. The 
point is not that disposal of state land or transfer of title to the 
previously disadvantaged is undesirable, but that state funds 
earmarked for market purchase of private, white-owned land are 
being used to purchase land from the state and is reported as 
‘redistribution’.
15 Speech by Annelize Crosby, legal affairs director of AgriSA, as 
reported in Farmers’ Weekly, 4 November 2005.
16 Land valuers (or valuators) constitute a statutorily regulated 
profession in South Africa.
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17 See Department of Land Affairs (1998), Naidoo (1999), May 
& Roberts (2000) and Ahmed et al. (2003) for examples 
of monitoring and evaluation and for discussions of their 
limitations.
18 For applicants without material assets, a nominal amount of R5 
000 is deemed to be contributed in the form of labour (‘sweat 
equity’), which entitles the applicant to a grant of R20 000.
19 While official policy (as distinct from official practice) is silent 
on issues such as land use, form of production and individual 
versus group production, it is remarkably clear on land tenure: 
all land reform projects are transferred in freehold title from the 
beginning, meaning that they can, in theory, be mortgaged and 
repossessed for loan default. Considerable uncertainly remains, 
however, around the tenure rights of individuals within group 
projects, where the single title deed rests with a legal entity such 
as a trust or a communal property association (CSIR 2005). 
20 Bradstock (2005:19) provides telling examples from case studies 
in the Northern Cape province: ‘The research findings showed 
that few households engaged in agricultural activities in spite 
of the fact that they now have access to land. Those that did 
have access produced small amounts primarily for home 
consumption …’
21 See Du Toit (2004) for an extremely negative assessment of land 
reform projects from a conservative perspective.
22 Indeed, there are suggestions that more land is being transferred 
from white to black owners through the open market than under 
the land reform programme (Lyne &Darroch 2001). But, as 
Borras (2005) has argued, such transfers merely represent the 
exchange of one asset class (cash) for another (land) amongst the 
relatively well-resourced, and therefore cannot be considered land 
reform (or redistribution) in the conventional sense.
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